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The rich countries of the world, especially those of Western Europe, are in the midst of a
truly remarkable demographic experience. Fertility rates are now far below the replacement
rate and the populations of these countries are therefore aging rapidly. At the same
time, the rich countries have been receiving substantial ﬂows of migrants from elsewhere
in Europe, North Africa, and the third world generally, partially oﬀsetting low native
fertility rates. For the foreseeable future, West European countries will confront a policy
tradeoﬀ between population aging and migration. This tradeoﬀ – which involves not only
“migration policy” narrowly construed, but a whole range of other ﬁscal and structural
policies such as EU enlargement – has many far-reaching consequences, since immigration
aﬀects all aspects of economic and social life.
The following discussion draws together empirical and theoretical ﬁndings from several
branches of inquiry in order to identify some of the important interactions between fer-
tility, migration, and ﬁscal policies. The basic theme of the paper is that demographic
change, past and prospective, carries major implications for the ﬁscal systems of the ad-
vanced economies, especially those of Western Europe. Diﬀerences in levels of economic
development means that the incentives for both skilled and unskilled workers to migrate
from relatively young third-world countries to relatively old rich countries are strong and
persistent. Both skilled and unskilled workers aﬀect the highly redistributive ﬁscal systems
of advanced economies, the ﬁrst as net contributors, the second as net beneﬁciaries. Global
competition for labor as well as demographic changes create incentives for the adjustment
of ﬁscal policies, especially in advanced economies, where the public sector plays a major
role in the redistribution of income. In particular, skilled workers generally oﬀer a ﬁscal
premium for the nations in which they reside. Competition for these workers aﬀects the
allocation of skilled labor throughout the world, with implications for earnings and income
levels and distribution, output, and other important economic outcomes.
It is impossible to foresee with any precision how these powerful forces will interact: as
the demographic developments of the past several decades show, our ability to predict
fertility and migration behavior is quite limited, and of course economic forecasting is
a notoriously inexact science. To these uncertainties, one must add the diﬃculties of
predicting policy changes through political processes which are sometimes democratic,
sometimes not so, sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent. With these qualiﬁcations in
mind, there is still at least a basis for a presumption that competitive pressures will work
to limit the extent of redistribution in rich countries, including not only intergenerational
redistribution but also other forms of explicit and implicit redistribution. At the same
time, global integration of factor markets should promote more productive utilization of
the world’s productive resources, including human capital. Factor market integration can
also strengthen incentives for human capital investment, both in rich and poor countries.
To set the stage for this discussion, Section 2 reviews some of the basic facts about fertility
and migration with particular reference to the countries of Western Europe. These facts
are becoming increasingly familiar but it is helpful to review fertility and migration trends
in relation to each other. Section 3 discusses the ﬁscal impacts of migration, emphasizing
that migrants (like all households) aﬀect both the revenue and the expenditure sides of
the ﬁscal accounts. They do so in ways that vary over the life cycle and that depend
1importantly both on the characteristics of the migrants themselves and of the ﬁscal systems
under which they live. Section 4 discusses why and how ﬁscal competition for migrants
may evolve over time, that is, the nature of policy adjustments that may arise as ﬁscal
systems adapt to internal (native age structures) and external (migration) demographic
forces. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Demographic and Economic Setting
2.1 Fertility Rates and Age Structures
Some of the basic demographic facts facing the countries of Western Europe are by now
relatively familiar. In particular, these countries are experiencing a true fertility bust.
The total fertility rate – the number of children born by a woman in her lifetime – is a
standard demographic measure for which data are available for many countries and many
years. The benchmark fertility rate is 2 – the number of children which women must have,
on average, if a population is to replenish itself over time.1 As shown in Table 1, fertility
rates in OECD countries are now at remarkably low levels. A simple unweighted average of
the fertility rates for the OECD countries is 1.56, far below the replacement rate. Figure 1,
which focuses on West European countries, show that today’s low fertility rates are hardly
a new phenomenon: whereas the simple unweighted average fertility rate was 2.7 in 1960
for the countries shown in Figure 1, this average had fallen below 2.0 by 1976 and below
1.7 by 1984. During the period 1994-2003, it fell below 1.6 before recovering slightly, to
about 1.61, in the two most recent years for which data are available (data drawn from
World Bank (2007)). The consequence of low and falling fertility rates (not to mention
rising life expectancies, as well), of course, is an aging population. Figure 3 illustrates the
basic trend. For West European countries, the old-age dependency ratio (population over
65 as a percentage of total population) has risen from 10 to more than 15 percent (a simple
unweighted average) since 1960. This “graying” of the population has been gradual and
well-documented.
Predicting the future is harder than documenting the past. In some respects, however,
demographic extrapolations are easier than economic forecasting because of the inertia
of demographic change. For example, all of those who will be 50 years old or older in
2050 are already born. Fertility rates in the future can certainly change, but a sudden
increase in the fertility rates of native-born Western Europeans back to the levels of the
1970s or earlier would be surprising; more likely, such an increase would not occur in
less than a decade or two, if at all. Barring major wars or epidemics, and abstracting
from migration, which is discussed further below, the evolution of the old-age dependency
ratio for the next several decades is largely already determined. Dang et al. (2001), for
example, present estimates (see Table 1) showing that old-age dependency ratios for OECD
countries will rise from the current level of about 25% to about 50% by the period 2035–
2050. (Similar estimates appear in European Commission (2005).) It should be noted that
1Since not all children survive to reproductive age and some are infertile, the benchmark rate is actually slightly higher
than 2 in advanced economies. A society with high mortality for young people would require a signiﬁcantly higher fertility
rate. The total fertility rate is of course not the sole important determinant of population growth. In particular, the timing
of births is important as well. In general, women in populations with low fertility rates also tend to have children at older
ages, reinforcing the trends described below.
2the low-fertility/rising old-age dependency pattern is far less pronounced in the US than
for other OECD countries, a reﬂection, in signiﬁcant part, of several decades of high rates
of immigration. It should also be noted that this basic pattern is found throughout Europe,
including in East European countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
These demographic data carry obvious implications for the public pension and health
systems of developed countries. As shown in Dang et al., the aging of populations in
OECD countries is expected to put ﬁscal systems in these countries under increasing
stress. For instance, spending on old-age pensions presently amounts to about 7.4% of
GDP for OECD countries2, and this proportion is projected to rise to about 10.8% by
2050 under mid-range demographic and economic assumptions. For France and Germany,
current spending is much higher, at about 12% of GDP, and is projected to rise to about
16% of GDP by 2050. For other countries, such as the UK and the US, this category
of spending is much lower (about 4.3% of GDP) and is projected to rise relatively little
(about one percentage point for the US) or even to fall (about 0.7 percentage points for
the UK). As a whole, however, the low fertility rates of the West European countries mean
that old-age-related spending (including not only old-age pensions but health-care and
other spending) will rise substantially over time, in the absence of signiﬁcant demographic
or economic change.
2.2 International Migration
A full appreciation of the demographic situation facing Western Europe cannot omit mi-
gration, which in turn depends critically on demographic and economic conditions in this
region relative to the rest of the world.
First, although fertility rates world-wide have been declining for some time, they remain
quite high in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa, Southern Africa, and South
Asia. As shown in Figure 3, fertility rates in these regions range from 2.8 (Sub-Saharan
Africa) to 3.3 (Middle East/North Africa), well above the replacement-rate benchmark
of 2.3 Thanks to their high fertility rates (and shorter life expectancies), countries in
these regions have much younger and more rapidly-growing populations than the nations
of Europe, West or East.
Furthermore, the populations in these other regions are relatively poor: as illustrated in
Figure 4, the countries of Western Europe (identiﬁed in World Bank data as the countries
of the European Monetary Union) have real per-capita incomes far higher than the nearby
regions of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, not to mention
the somewhat more-distant regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. In 2006, the
EMU countries had a per-capita GDP of $21,704 (2000 dollars). Of the other regions shown
in Figure 5, “Europe and Central Asia” (a classiﬁcation that includes Eastern Europe and
the countries of the former Soviet Union) has the highest current per capita GDP, at $2689
in 2006, while per-capita GDP in the Middle East and North Africa was $1839, in South
Asia it was $605, and in Sub-Saharan Africa it was $583. As Figure 4 shows, the trends
of the past half-century provide no basis for any expectation that the gap in per capita
incomes will close to less than a factor of 5 in the next several decades. Income diﬀerentials
2This is a simple unweighted average for these countries; see Dang et al., Table IV:4.
3Additional data on fertility, age structure, and life expectancies throughout the world can be found in UN (2004).
3of this magnitude swamp measurement errors.
Strong current and future demographic potential and economic incentives for people to
migrate to Western Europe from Eastern Europe and from many poor regions of the world
are apparent from the data just described. The eﬀect of these incentives, even in the face
of somewhat restrictive migration policies, is easily seen.
To begin with, Table 2 displays inﬂows and outﬂows of population, expressed as a per-
centage of total population, as well as net and gross ﬂows, for West European countries.
These countries generally exhibit positive net migration since 1988, though of course with
some variation.4 (The implications of high gross migration rates are discussed later.) The
cumulative eﬀects of net immigration ﬂows are shown in Tables 3 and 4, which present
two measures of the stock of “immigrants,” corresponding to two diﬀerent measures that
are typically used in population records. Table 3 shows that the stock of “foreign-born”
individuals in several West European OECD countries (Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Sweden) amounts to more than 10% of the total population, close to (or exceeding) the US
ﬁgure of 12.9%. Table 4 shows stocks of “foreign” population for a number of (mainly West
European) countries. The key diﬀerence between “foreign” and “foreign-born” is that an
immigrant who acquires citizenship, though still foreign-born, is no longer counted as for-
eign. Foreign populations are generally smaller than foreign-born populations, especially
in countries with high rates of naturalization, as is apparent from a comparison of those
countries for which both measures are available. For instance, there are more than twice
as many foreign-born as foreign in both Sweden and the Netherlands.
Immigrants account for a signiﬁcant share of the populations of West European countries
today. A sense of what the future may hold can be obtained by comparing migration ﬂows
in recent years with the other sources of demographic change – fertility and mortality. As
shown in Figure 5 (see OECD (2003, Chart I.10)), the combination of sustained positive net
migration and low fertility means that for the EU as a whole, and for a number of individual
countries, the rate of net migration has exceeded the rate of natural increase since the mid-
1980s.5 Immigrants are younger than native populations and their fertility rates reﬂect
those of their native countries until they become assimilated into their new countries of
residence.6 For both of these reasons, the demographic, economic, and ﬁscal impacts
of immigration are certain to become more prominent in the near future: the foreign-
born population, and their immediate oﬀspring, will constitute a growing fraction of the
West European population for several decades. As a matter of demographic inertia, this
would be true, even if immigration ﬂows were assumed (say, as the result of unrealistically
draconian policy restrictions) to drop instantly to zero. As we have seen, however, the
fundamental incentives for immigrants to come to Western Europe from the younger and
4The migration data in this and the following tables reﬂect legal migration. By its nature, illegal migration is diﬃcult
to document. The US Oﬃce of Immigration Statistics (2003) estimates that there were 3.5 million illegal immigrants in
the US in 1990, a number that grew to 7 million by the year 2000, representing an average annual inﬂow of about 0.35
million. These ﬁgures may be compared to a ﬂow of 4.5 million legal immigrants during the decade 1971–1980, 7.3 million
during 1981–1990, and 9.1 million during 1991–2000, suggesting that illegal immigrants constitute about 20–30% of the total
annual US immigrant ﬂow in recent decades. More recently, the Department of Homeland Security has estimated that the
population of “unauthorized” immigrants was approximately 8.5 million in 2000 and that this ﬁgure had risen to 11.6 million
by 2006 (see Hoefer et al. 2007). Similar ﬁgures might be presumed for West Europe, in which case the ﬁgures shown in
Tables 2–4 signiﬁcantly underestimate the net immigration ﬂows and stocks.
5Figure 5 illustrates clearly that while net migration rates ﬂuctuate over time for individual countries, the overall net
migration rate for the EU is relatively stable, showing the importance of local short-run variations in labor demand as well
local migration and other policies.
6See, e.g., Bauer et al. (2000) for a review of the literature on the assimilation of immigrants.
4poorer regions of the world are large and highly persistent. Variations in local economic
conditions and policies may deﬂect future immigration ﬂows from one country to another,
but the share of immigrants and their immediate oﬀspring will certainly rise for many
decades to come.
2.3 Age-Related Spending: Migration to the Rescue?
If the populations of Western Europe are age-imbalanced due to sustained low fertility, and
if the populations of poor countries are relatively young due to continued comparatively
high fertility, and if large income diﬀerentials create powerful incentives for the latter
to migrate toward the former, perhaps international migration will restore a more age-
balanced demographic structure in Western Europe, providing the active labor force needed
to ﬁnance social beneﬁts for the elderly. In short, perhaps migration will “solve” the age-
related issues facing the ﬁscal systems of Western Europe.7
It is impossible to forecast migration ﬂows and their impacts without forecasting migration
policies, and part of the task of the following discussion is precisely to assess the incentives
for rich and aging countries to adjust their migration policies. Nevertheless, it is instructive
to consider hypothetical extrapolations of migration trends to see how they could possibly
aﬀect the populations of destination countries. An analysis by the UN (2000) provides
“best guess” projections for migration and demographic structure and examines what
migration ﬂows would permit the attainments of various demographic targets.
The mid-range projections of this study ﬁnd that West European countries will experience
continued net immigration for the next half century. Under these projections, immigration
will mitigate but not fundamentally alter the basic demographic trends implied by low
fertility. The European Union is projected to absorb approximately 16 million immigrants
by 2050, but the “support ratio,” that is, the number of people age 15–64 divided by
the number of people over 65, would still fall from its 1995 value of 4.3 to 1.97 by 2050.
Although this “medium variant” projection is higher than the projected 1.89 under the
assumption of zero net migration, it also indicates that continued immigration, at rates
similar to those experienced in recent decades, will not dramatically aﬀect the age structure
of the population (UN 2000, Tables IV.4 and IV.5).
Indeed, to maintain the 1995 support ratio of 4.3, the EU countries would need to absorb
about 12 million immigrants annually, in contrast to annual ﬂows throughout the 1990s
of at most 1.3 million. Sustained over the next 50 years, this ten-fold higher immigration
rate would result in about 700 million net immigrants; by 2050, about 75% of the total
EU population would either be immigrants or the descendants of post-1995 immigrants, in
contrast to the medium-variant projection of 6.2% (UN 2000, Tables IV.4, IV.7). One can
use these two cases – a constant support ratio compared to one that falls by somewhat more
than half in 2050 – to gauge the migration implications of various intermediate cases. In
the absence of extremely high immigration rates, sustained over many decades, low fertility
rates and long life expectancies imply that the countries of Western Europe will face age-
imbalance demographic structures, and their ﬁscal consequences, for the foreseeable future.
7Storesletten (2000) examines the impact of immigration on the US social security system.
53 Fiscal Impacts of Migration
Immigrants aﬀect a country’s ﬁscal system in many diﬀerent ways, starting from the mo-
ment of arrival and continuing throughout the life cycle (or as long as the immigrant
remains in the country).8 The paragraphs to follow focus on the impact of immigration
on public pension systems, an important issue for advanced economies in view of their
current demographic, economic, and ﬁscal circumstances as described above. Before turn-
ing to a detailed discussion of public pensions, however, it is useful to consider the ﬁscal
implications of migration in a somewhat broader context.
To begin with, note that immigrants, like all of a country’s residents, contribute to public-
sector revenues and impose public-service burdens in multitude of ways, direct and indirect.
These eﬀects depend on the immigrant’s age, sex, health, consumption patterns, education
level, earnings, savings behavior, legal status, and other socio-economic characteristics.
Most of these characteristics change over time and vary from one person to another, and
the ﬁscal impacts of immigration are as diverse and complex as immigrants and ﬁscal
systems. Accurate and comprehensive assessments are diﬃcult and generalizations, though
possible, can easily be misleading or inappropriate for the analysis of important types of
policy questions. This becomes increasingly apparent as one reviews systematically the
revenue- and expenditure-side interactions of migrants with a country’s ﬁscal system.
Consider the revenue side ﬁrst. In West European countries, social insurance contributions,
personal income and payroll taxes, and value-added taxes are major sources of tax revenues.
Legal immigrants (or their employers) pay taxes on earnings, either through payroll taxes
or personal income taxes, in amounts that depend positively on the immigrant’s earnings.
Both legal and illegal immigrants pay value-added taxes, in amounts that depend on
consumption preferences as well as income. These sources of revenues will be relatively
small for low-income immigrants but larger for those with higher incomes – which, in turn,
means (on average) for those with better education, better health, in the peak earnings part
of the life cycle, and with greater amounts of accumulated non-human wealth. Note that all
or most of these attributes are potentially observable and can be (and in practice are) used
as explicit or implicit screens for determining “desired” types of immigrants. Moreover,
changes in tax policy – the mix of diﬀerent taxes, their rates, and their administration and
enforcement – change the tax treatment of immigrants relative to natives and of diﬀerent
types of immigrants, oﬀering important opportunities for diﬀerential ﬁscal treatment of
immigrants.
Immigrants also generate revenues through non-tax sources. Prices or fees are or could
be used to defray the costs of public services such as health, education, transportation,
and housing. As a matter of policy choice, these revenue instruments can be used more or
less intensively, and, in some cases, they are or can be used diﬀerentially for immigrants.
For instance, fares for public transportation are commonly collected from all users, inde-
pendently of citizenship status and, for that matter, usually independently of legal status.
As in the case of tax policy, however, there are many ways in which the structure of
transportation pricing diﬀerentiates implicitly if not explicitly between native residents
8Emigrants also aﬀect ﬁscal systems. Many of the remarks that follow are equally applicable, in reverse, for emigrants,
and both are important. Obviously, the ﬁscal eﬀects of migration, in either direction, are especially critical in countries
where ﬁscal systems are “large,” i.e., in practice, in rich countries. By conventional measures, redistributive ﬁscal policies in
poor countries are quite limited, and the ﬁscal impacts of migration are accordingly much smaller.
6and diﬀerent types of immigrants. As one illustration, special discounts or subscriptions
are sometimes made available for the elderly, students, or other demographic or economic
subgroups, a price structure that diﬀerentially aﬀects immigrants. Similarly, access to hos-
pitals and clinics may be diﬀerentially priced for those who participate in national health
systems, eﬀectively discriminating among users based on citizenship or legal status. In the
US, at least, it is common for explicit tuition charges at public colleges and universities to
distinguish between in-state and out-of-state students, with non-citizens included in the
latter category, and ﬁnancial aid programs, utilized by students attending both private and
public institutions, can and do discriminate on the characteristics of students (and their
families). Although prices for access to higher education in West Europe are normally
much lower than in the US, this is a policy choice and the option exists to alter the policy,
including in ways that would require foreign students to bear a larger share of the costs of
education provided to them.
On the expenditure side, immigrants will, of necessity, beneﬁt from non-exclusive public
goods and services, even though these may be congestible, i.e., even if immigrants impose
added costs of service provision and, in this way, aﬀect the ﬁscal system. Examples of
public services with limited excludability but signiﬁcant congestibility include public safety
(expenditures on police and ﬁre protection depend on the size of the population being
served), public health and sanitation (sewage, water treatment, refuse collection), parks
and recreation, and (unpriced) roads. Nevertheless, as already suggested, access to public
services may be in some cases be restricted to citizens or at least to legal immigrants, or, if
desired, targeted at immigrants. Policy decisions about the location of public facilities such
as health clinics or schools (e.g., whether to locate such facilities in immigrant enclaves) or
about whether to provide multilingual services diﬀerentially aﬀect immigrants and natives,
implicitly or explicitly.
For some public-sector activities, the ﬁscal impact of immigrants may be somewhat indi-
rect. Insofar as publicly-provided housing, rent subsidies, or tax preferences for the housing
sector increase housing supply and lower the equilibrium price of housing, all housing con-
sumers are made better oﬀ, regardless of immigrant or citizenship status. The same is true
for subsidies that increase the supplies of medical personnel, pharmaceuticals, elder-care
facilities, and the like: to the extent that these policies aﬀect the equilibrium prices, all
consumers share in the beneﬁts and add to the ﬁscal burden.
The children of immigrants also aﬀect a country’s ﬁscal system, both on the revenue and
expenditure sides, whether or not they are immigrants themselves. From an ex ante policy
perspective, these eﬀects are contingent upon the initial arrival of the immigrant parent(s),
and thus, arguably, should be included in a comprehensive analysis of the impact of im-
migration. To do otherwise would, in eﬀect, amount to the assumption that immigrants
will be infertile, an assumption which is certainly extreme and, for “representative” re-
cent immigrants in Western European countries, is empirically quite incorrect since, as
noted earlier, these immigrants often tend to have higher fertility rates than native West
Europeans.
As these general remarks indicate, immigrants interact with a jurisdictions ﬁscal system
in many ways over time. A proper assessment of the ﬁscal impact of immigration would
ideally take into account the totality of these interactions.
73.1 Immigration and Public Pension Systems
All aspects of the ﬁscal impact of immigration are worthy of careful analysis. The impacts
of immigrants on public pension systems are of special interest, however, for several reasons.
First, as noted earlier, public pensions are major elements of the ﬁscal systems of West
European nations. Second, since participants in these systems pay taxes when young and
receive beneﬁts when old, public pension systems illustrate very well the importance of
considering both the tax and the expenditure sides of government accounts simultaneously,
and in an intertemporal context. Third, the beneﬁts and costs of public pensions are
comparatively easily measured, at least in principle.
At a basic theoretical level, the concept of “net public pension wealth” (NPPW) (Feldstein
(1974)) provides a convenient summary of the impact of a public pension system on a
household’s lifetime wealth. NPPW is the present value of future public pension beneﬁts
received by a household, net of taxes paid into the public pension system. If NPPW > 0
for an individual or household, participation in the system involves a net transfer to the
household from the rest of society, whereas the opposite is the case if NPPW < 0. This
variable, or its negative, also measures the present value of the impact of a household on
the public pension system.
More formally, suppose that households are life-cycle utility-maximizers who supply labor
inelastically and who have utility functions deﬁned over lifetime consumption streams.9
Retirement occurs with certainty at age R and death occurs with certainty at age D. As-
sume that every household supplies one unit of labor until retirement, earning wi annually
if it resides in country i. (The assumptions that labor supply and annual earnings are con-
stant over time are made for notational simplicity.) Let ct denote the value of consumption
in period t of the life cycle, and r denote a ﬁxed market interest rate. In the absence of









(1 + r)t. (1)
The budget constraint for an older household is identical to (1) except that it covers a
shorter horizon, beginning at some initial t0 > 0.
To incorporate a public pension system into this framework, suppose that the beneﬁt
received by a worker in country i is a lump-sum annuity of bi, ﬁnanced by a proportional
payroll tax at rate τi. (It is straightforward to use more a realistic speciﬁcation at the cost
of slightly more complex notation.) Then the budget constraint facing a worker residing












(1 + r)t. (2)
Public pensions raise lifetime wealth by providing a ﬂow of beneﬁts during retirement, but
reduce lifetime wealth by requiring a ﬂow of contributions during the working years. The
9This framework is presented and discussed in more detail in Wildasin (1999). See Uebelmesser (2004) for a recent
discussion of public pension systems and many additional references to the literature.









(1 + r)t. (3)
The sign and magnitude of this expression depends on market prices (wages and interest
rates), individual household attributes (current age, labor market participation and earn-
ings, ages of retirement and death), and of course on the policy parameters – the tax rate
and beneﬁt level.
In principle, the computation of NPPWi is not a complex undertaking, but in practice
there is much room for variations in its estimation.10 The impact of a country’s public-
pension system on a household net lifetime wealth depends on the household’s earnings
and the country’s policies, as is also true when calculating the impact of migration on a
country’s public pension system: how much immigrants pay in taxes or receive in beneﬁts
depends on their employment and earnings paths over the life cycle as well as on tax and
expenditure policies, which are only observable retrospectively. Analysis of the historical
impact of immigrants on a public pension system, while interesting, does not provide direct
information about the impact of prospective immigrants on the future of a public pension
system. The evaluation of this eﬀect requires information which cannot be known with
certainty and can only be imperfectly foreseen.
Despite its inevitable limitations, net public pension wealth does provide a present-value
measure of the ﬁscal interactions between a household (or individual) and a public-pension
system. It takes into account both the tax contributions made by the household and the
expenditures on beneﬁts that it receives at diﬀerent stages of the life cycle, discounted to
the present. For West European countries, estimated net public pension wealth is typically
negative, and substantially so, for representative young workers. One way to assess this
particular ﬁscal burden is to compare NPPW with lifetime wealth, that is, with the
present value of lifetime earnings. This burden can easily exceed 10% of lifetime wealth
(Wildasin (1999)). Expressed somewhat diﬀerently, participation in the public pension
systems of some West European countries would, on balance, be equivalent to imposing a
payroll tax at a rate of (say) 10% over a households entire lifetime.
More generally, looking beyond public pension systems and evaluating the total ﬁscal
system more comprehensively, one can apply the methodology of “generational account-
ing,” an exercise which requires projections of future policy, economic, and demographic
variables (see especially Auerbach et al. 1999). The basic ﬁnding from research on gen-
erational accounting research is that current ﬁscal policies in advanced economies, within
the context of standard demographic and economic projections, exhibit signiﬁcant gener-
ational imbalances in the sense that ﬁscal policy, on balance, shifts resources toward those
10As noted by Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), and as discussed much more fully in Leimer and Lesnoy (1980, 1981), the
calculation of NPPWi is a forward-looking exercise. If a calculation of NPPWi is to be used as an explanatory variable for
predicting household behavior, then what is needed is an estimate of expected NPPWi. The savings or migration behavior of
today’s 20 or 30 year-olds may be aﬀected by public pension systems in which they will participate for another half-century,
and although it is reasonable to imagine that households do make forward-looking decisions, it is not at all obvious how
they gauge their own life prospects (future employment and earnings, health, and mortality) or future public-sector ﬁscal
policies over such long periods of time. The same basic issues arise in a diﬀerent but related area of analysis: the eﬀect
of public pension systems on fertility. As discussed in Barro and Becker (1988), Becker and Barro (1989), and Wildasin
(1990,a), future public-sector debt obligations reduce the return to child-bearing for altruistically-disposed parents. Whether
future public-pension obligations in EU countries help to explain lower current fertility rates in this region is an intriguing
hypothesis, but one that presents formidable challenges for empirical research.
9presently alive, at the expense of future generations. Existing public sector debt obliga-
tions constitute one important component of the ﬁscal burden that future generations face,
but the generational accounting approach makes clear that the implicit liabilities of the
public sector are also quite large. Underfunded public pension obligations – that is, the
fact that net public pension wealth is negative for current and future generations – are the
outstanding example of such implicit liabilities.
Because of anticipated demographic changes, young immigrants to EU countries with
attributes similar to those of existing residents are generally expected to be “net ﬁscal
contributors.” That is, the ﬁscal system is positively aﬀected by the arrival of such immi-
grants, taking into account the entire lifetime impact of the households interaction with
the public pension system. From the viewpoint of the existing (native) residents of the
country, this emigrant confers a ﬁscal beneﬁt by adding more to the revenue side of the
ﬁscal system than the burden imposed on the expenditure side. The immigrant produces
a “net ﬁscal beneﬁt” to the existing population of the country. The magnitude of the net
ﬁscal beneﬁt that immigrants produce vary from country to country, as is apparent from
the estimates in Wildasin (1999) and Kotlikoﬀ and Liebfritz (1999). The latter authors
summarize ﬁndings on generational accounts for 17 diﬀerent countries, including both de-
veloped and developing countries. For Germany and France, the present value of net ﬁscal
contributions that would be made by a 25-year-old immigrant who is economically similar
to existing residents would be in excess of $300,000 (1995 dollars). For Denmark, Swe-
den, the Netherlands, and Belgium, the corresponding ﬁgure lies between $200,000 and
$300,000, for a few EU countries (Norway, Italy) this ﬁgure is less than $200,000 and, in
one case, that of Portugal, the ﬁgure is only about $85,000.
3.2 Diﬀerential Fiscal Impacts: By Type of Migrant and By Type of Pension
System
While it may seem natural to focus on the ﬁscal impacts of “representative” households
or immigrants, a migrant’s net ﬁscal impact on a country, whether measured by NPPWi
alone or more comprehensively, depends (a) on the demographic and economic charac-
teristics of the migrant and (b) on the characteristics of the ﬁscal system – the tax and
beneﬁt structure of the public pension system – in country i. For example, NPPWi is
larger – i.e., the net ﬁscal beneﬁt of an immigrant is smaller – for older immigrants, since
they contribute to the public pension system for a shorter period of time before drawing
beneﬁts. Since beneﬁts in most public pension systems rise less than in proportion to
lifetime contributions, NPPWi is smaller (more negative) for immigrants with high earn-
ings; that is, the net ﬁscal beneﬁt to country i from an immigrant is higher, the higher
the immigrants earnings. Skilled workers are thus likely to be net ﬁscal contributors to
public pension systems. Illegal immigrants may not be able receive beneﬁts from the
public pension system at all (an attempt to draw beneﬁts might lead to deportation) but
the employers of such immigrants might still withhold payroll taxes (perhaps on the basis
of false documentation provided by the immigrant), in which case NPPWi is deﬁnitely
negative: the worker contributes to the public pension system but never receives beneﬁts
from it. At least from the perspective of the public pension system, the net ﬁscal beneﬁt
from such an immigrant is deﬁnitely positive, even if the worker has rather low earnings.
To take still one more example: since life expectancy is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by nutrition
10and disease in early childhood, immigrants from poor countries have lower life expectan-
cies than those from rich countries. Holding other immigrant characteristics (including
earnings) constant, NPPWi would be lower for immigrants from poor countries than for
those from rich countries, i.e., the net ﬁscal beneﬁt of immigrants from poor countries
would be greater than that for immigrants from rich countries, other things the same.
The same immigrant can have quite diﬀerent net public pension wealth in diﬀerent coun-
tries. For instance, suppose that the public pension system in country i is “Bismarkian”
in the sense that beneﬁts depend positively on earnings whereas the system in country j is
“Beveridgean,” that is, beneﬁts are relatively uniform regardless of earnings. Other things
the same, for a high-earnings individual, NPPWi > NPPWj, that is, a high earner would
beneﬁt more from, or suﬀer less from, the system with earnings-dependent beneﬁts. The
reverse would be true for a low-earner. As a further example, suppose that a countrys
public pension system is changing over time and that this is anticipated by households.
For instance, in view of the data described above, one might anticipate that public pension
beneﬁts will be falling over time for many West European countries, while taxes may be
rising. These changes reduce NPPWi for all households, increasing the net ﬁscal beneﬁt
of immigration to existing local residents.
There are of course many conceivable types of immigrants, and the immigration ﬂows that
actually occur result in a mix of diverse types of immigrants. The preceding remarks in-
dicate the net ﬁscal beneﬁt (or cost) of immigration for the existing residents of a country
depends not only on the total number of immigrants but on the composition of the im-
migrant ﬂow. For this reason, it can be misleading to speak of the impact of immigrants
on a public pension system. Furthermore, the diﬀerential ﬁscal impacts of diﬀerent types
of migrants mean that policies that selectively or diﬀerentially aﬀect migration ﬂows can
have quite diverse ﬁscal implications.
3.3 Toward a More Complete Picture
Public pension systems well illustrate how migration aﬀects both the revenue and the
expenditure sides of the ﬁscal accounts and how the ﬁscal impact of immigration may
occur over many periods, with immigrants possibly making net ﬁscal contributions in
some periods and imposing net ﬁscal burdens in other periods. The impact immigrants
on pension systems also depends on the characteristics of the immigrants and on the
characteristics of the ﬁscal system.
These remarks are more broadly applicable to the analysis of the impact of migration
on ﬁscal systems. The parallel with public pension systems is particularly obvious in
the case of public-sector health expenditures, the beneﬁts of which are closely linked to
age and which, like public pensions, are often ﬁnanced by taxes on working populations.
But these observations apply generally when considering the totality of the interactions
between an immigrant and a countrys ﬁscal system. In principle, one could ascertain the
full ﬁscal impact of immigration by particular types of immigrants in a particular country
by analyzing all of the ways in which they interact with the ﬁscal system over the entire
period of their residence. This would, however, require knowledge not only of immigrant
characteristics and how they change over time (e.g., changes in earnings, employment,
and health over the life cycle) but of the characteristics of the ﬁscal system and how they
11change over time (e.g., changes in tax rates, expenditures, and regulations aﬀecting public
expenditure programs and tax systems).
Public pension and health programs are by no means the only important elements of the
ﬁscal systems of rich countries that are sensitive to migration. The revenue ﬂows from
virtually all types of taxation, whether based on consumption, income, or wealth, depend
crucially on both the size and the socio-economic composition of the population to which
they are applied. For example, the revenue impacts of immigration are highly sensitive
to the current and future income and wealth of immigrants. One important illustration
will suﬃce. The top 0.2% of US taxpayers – those at the very highest income levels (in
excess of $1 million) – account for some 25.2% of income tax revenues, amounting to more
than $775,000 in annual taxes paid per taxpayer (US Treasury (2007)).11 Since there
are only about 175,000 such taxpayers, an increase or decrease in their numbers by, say,
80,000 would have profound consequences for the US ﬁscal system, resulting in swing of
total personal income tax revenues of as much as 10% (cet. par.). To anticipate later
discussion, it is evident from this example that “not all immigrants are created equal”
from a ﬁscal perspective. Among other implications, it is easy to see why gross as well
as net migration can be of great importance ﬁscal systems: an outﬂow of 80,000 high-
income taxpayers and their replacement by an equal number of poor immigrants would
drastically worsen the ﬂow of revenues to the US Federal government (not to mention the
subnational governments). Similar remarks apply, but with less force, to taxes that are
less progressively distributed.
The eﬀects of demographic change in relation to debt warrants explicit mention as well.
Outstanding debt (i.e., explicit government debt) amounts to 50–100% of GDP for most
rich countries. The obligations of debt service fall on future taxpayers, especially those
with high incomes. Reductions in fertility (especially by well-educated households with
high lifetime incomes), if accompanied by increases in immigration (especially of well-
educated immigrants with high lifetime incomes), will shift future tax burdens away from
native populations and their descendants toward immigrants and their descendants.
Because immigrants and ﬁscal systems are diverse and ever-changing, it is diﬃcult or im-
possible to arrive at deﬁnitive assessments of “the” ﬁscal impacts of immigration. However,
in addition to the generational accounting analyses mentioned above, a growing number
of recent studies shed signiﬁcant light on this topic. For instance, Hansen and Lofstrom
(2001, 2003) observe that while immigrants (the foreign born) account for about 10% of
the Swedish population, they are the recipients of about 30% of welfare expenditures.
Moreover, “refugee” immigrants have much lower employment and much higher (and per-
sistent) welfare participation rates than immigrants from other Nordic countries, and these
diﬀerences are quite persistent over time (Hansen and Lofstrom (2001)). This means, of
course, that refugee immigrants pay relatively little in taxes, in addition to imposing high
costs on the public sector. For Sweden, it is clear that not all immigrants are the same,
from the ﬁscal perspective: the composition of the immigrant ﬂow is a matter of great
importance in assessing the ﬁscal impact of migration. Riphahn (1998) reports generally
similar ﬁndings for Germany, emphasizing that there, too, welfare expenditures on behalf
11It may be amusing to note that many of these taxpayers are literally worth more to the ﬁsc than their weight in gold:
at current prices ($900/oz.), an average adult male’s weight-equivalent (190 lbs.) of gold is worth around $2.7 million.
Under conservative assumptions about life expectancy and discount rate, the present value of taxes paid by very high income
taxpayers can easily exceed this amount.
12of immigrants account for a very large share of total expenditures.12 Wadensj¨ o and Orrje
(2002) present a very comprehensive assessment of the ﬁscal impacts of immigrants in Den-
mark, distinguishing again between immigrants from less developed and more developed
countries and closely analyzing both tax and expenditure impacts of immigration over the
life cycle. These authors also ﬁnd that immigrants from poorer countries pay less in taxes
and receive more in beneﬁts than other types of immigrants.
By contrast, Collado and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2004) ﬁnd that immigrants to Spain – includ-
ing recent immigrants from relatively poor countries – have employment rates as high as
or higher than those of natives and earnings that are roughly 75% of the native level.
They estimate that expansion of existing immigration ﬂows, assuming that “marginal”
immigrants are similar to existing immigrants, would have net positive ﬁscal impacts.
Comparing results for the US presented by Auerbach and Oreopolous (2000) and Gust-
man and Steinmeier (2000), who ﬁnd that immigrants have only a modest ﬁscal impact,
Collado and Iturbe-Ormaetxe note that human capital and earnings diﬀerentials between
natives and recent immigrants in the US is substantially larger than is the case for Spain,
reﬂecting the characteristics both of native populations and of immigrants.
4 Competition for Mobile Labor: Why and in What Form?
This section explores some of the potential implications of international labor mobility for
policy adjustment. The focus is mainly on the adjustment of ﬁscal and migration policies
in rich (i.e., destination) countries, using a no-migration benchmark as a reference case.
The third part of the section, however, explores the implications of global competition for
skilled labor for human capital investment, both in rich and in poor (i.e., origin) countries.
4.1 Margins of Fiscal Adjustment: No Migration
As a matter of arithmetic, rich countries will have to make policy adjustments during
coming decades in order to deal with intergenerational ﬁscal imbalances. Leaving migration
aside momentarily, there are only two fundamental margins of ﬁscal adjustment: reductions
in public expenditures or increases in revenues. Through the use of debt and other ﬁscal
policies, these adjustments may be distributed over time and across generations in many
ways. To facilitate the analysis of migration and ﬁscal adjustment, it is helpful, as a
benchmark, to review the range of policy options in the absence of migration.
Most obviously, ﬁscal imbalances in key age-related expenditure programs such as public
pension and health systems can be managed by reductions in health and retirement beneﬁts
or by increases in taxes on working populations. These reforms could be achieved relatively
uniformly, by scaling down all existing beneﬁts and scaling up all existing taxes, or they
could be more selectively, for instance by cut beneﬁts or raising taxes more for those with
higher incomes.
Changes in other elements of the overall ﬁscal system may also be used to manage ﬁscal
12In the US, non-natives account for about 18% of participants in Food Stamps, AFDC/TANF (C. Bollinger, personal
communication), and Medicaid and (at 11% of the population) are thus overrepresented in the population of social beneﬁts
recipients, though to a lesser degree than in the EU countries just mentioned. See also Bollinger and Hagstrom (2003, 2004.
13imbalances, too, eﬀectively, if sometimes implicitly, reducing beneﬁts or increasing taxes
for diﬀerent socio-economic or age groups. For instance, the funding of retirement sys-
tems could be augmented with revenues from other parts of the tax system (i.e., from
“general” funds) in addition to payroll taxes. By comparison with increased payroll taxes,
higher levels of consumption-based taxation (like VATs) would shift ﬁscal burdens toward
the old, including the retired population, and would eﬀectively reduce their retirement
beneﬁts. Taxes based on non-human wealth or the return to non-human wealth (like
comprehensive personal income taxes) would also shift burdens toward older generations
relative to a payroll tax. Reductions in public expenditures other than retirement-related
programs (general social assistance, unemployment, education, and infrastructure) would
shift ﬁscal burdens toward younger age cohorts. At a basic level, the fungibility of ﬁscal
resources implies that age-related ﬁscal imbalances may be managed by revenue increases
or expenditure reductions throughout the entirety of the ﬁscal system. Furthermore, these
adjustments may occur rapidly, but, through the use explicit and implicit government
debt, they may also be partially deferred and thus distributed across generations extend-
ing further into the future.
The laws of ﬁscal arithmetic dictate that some combination of these adjustments must
take place, deﬁning a menu of policy options. How the political process will ultimately
select among these options is diﬃcult to determine. Nevertheless, diﬀerent models of the
political economy of policymaking over time, even if not deﬁnitive in their predictions,
oﬀer some indications of the forces at work.
First, simple voting models, in which sheer numbers can be decisive, suggest that growing
numbers of elderly voters could gain increased or even complete control of the political
process, maintaining or even raising public pension beneﬁts while insuring that the cost of
insuring these beneﬁts is shifted to some other population group (younger workers, princi-
pally). The political power of the elderly, it would seem, can hardly weaken substantially
as they grow more numerous. On the other hand, voters in any age group have diverse
characteristics and preferences and do not vote uniformly. Also, diﬀerent interest groups or
factions can inﬂuence policymaking not only through their impact on voting but through
the expenditure of resources on lobbying and pressure-group politics.
However political interests are represented and expressed, it is important to recognize that
public expenditures and taxes are not lump-sum in nature and are therefore subject to
those who beneﬁt from a policy are subject to diminishing marginal beneﬁts and rising
marginal costs. In simple “reduced form” models of the political process (e.g., Becker
(1983, 1985)), observed (equilibrium) policies reﬂect a balance or tradeoﬀ among contend-
ing groups. Distortionary taxes that give rise to an increasing “marginal cost of public
funds” can help to explain the limits on majoritarian redistribution at a point in time
(e.g., Meltzer-Richard (1981)) or across generations (Barro (1979), Wildasin (1990, b)).13
To illustrate, consider a simple overlapping generations model with a two-period life-cycle
in which the utility of retirees (the old) depends only on their own consumption while
the utility of the working population (the young) depends on their consumption in each
period (c1 and c2), their leisure (`), the level of education provided to their children (e),
and other public goods z, as represented by a life-cycle utility function u(c1,c2,`,e,z). The
13As Mulligan (2001) observes, normative analyses of the optimal structure of second-best policies (e.g., in the tradition
of Mirrlees (1971)) can thus provide important insights into the equilibria of political economy models.
14public sector provides cash transfers to the elderly as well as education for the young, and
assume for the moment that the government ﬁnances incremental expenditures through
pay-as-you-go changes in taxes on the earnings of young workers.14
Under these assumptions, one can calculate the change in the welfare for a young household
resulting from an incremental change in the level of public-pension beneﬁts. If leisure is
a normal good and if the wage and income elasticities of labor supply are not directly
aﬀected by demographic changes, one can show (see Wildasin, 1990, b) that a decrease in
the number of working households relative to the number of retirees reduces the net beneﬁt
(or raises the net cost) to young workers of a marginal increase in public-pension beneﬁts.
In particular, if young workers are harmed by an expansion of public-pension beneﬁts,
they are harmed more when they are less numerous, relative to the retired population. If
their political inﬂuence (through voter turnout, lobbying, or other channels) depends on
their intensity of preferences, then aging of the population reduces the equilibrium level of
public-pension beneﬁts per retiree. Similarly, a marginal increase in education spending
beneﬁts young workers (i.e., parents) less, or harms then more, when there are relatively
more elderly retirees in the society. The underlying logic is the same: an increase in
the number of elderly, cet. par., requires higher public pension expenditures, raising the
shadow value of public-sector revenues and thus the cost, at the margin, of incremental
public spending of any kind at all.
This discussion has assumed that incremental changes in public spending are ﬁnanced
through contemporaneous changes in taxes on the earnings of young workers. There are of
course other ﬁnancing possibilities, notably including deferral of taxes through incremental
deﬁcit ﬁnancing. The development of a fully-speciﬁed model of intergenerational political
equilibrium goes beyond the scope of the present analysis, but intertemporal tax-smoothing
considerations imply that distortionary earnings taxes will be utilized in all periods. Thus,
an increase in the proportion of elderly in the population, which raises political pressures
to limit spending ﬁnanced by the current young generation, would also be expected to
result in some shifting of taxes to future generations through an increase in borrowing.
In summary, population aging and associated ﬁnancial stresses on the public pension
and health systems are expected to lead to adjustment along virtually all margins of
ﬁscal policy. As total pension and health expenditures on beneﬁts for the aged increase
due to aging of the population, the shadow value of public-sector resources rises. This
creates incentives to raise revenue yields from all sources and to reduce expenditures of
all kinds, spreading the ﬁscal impact of an aging population throughout the ﬁscal system.
Higher government borrowing and reduced spending on education and infrastructure oﬀer
additional degrees of freedom for ﬁscal adjustment, shifting some of the ﬁscal costs of an
aging population forward to future generations.15
14In other words, changes in public-pension beneﬁts or in education spending are not ﬁnanced by changes in government
net liabilities, a policy experiment that thus abstracts from changes in government debt policy. In this model, “taxes on the
earnings of the young” could represent payroll or income taxes, or, with careful interpretation, taxes on consumption like
VATs.
15Models of intertemporal tax smoothing highlight the gradual adjustment of taxes (and, implicitly, of other expenditures)
in response to ﬁscal shocks. The ﬁnancing of World War II through borrowing is the outstanding empirical example. The
above remarks similarly treat increased spending on aging populations as a “ﬁscal shock” that triggers policy adjustments
over time. Unlike World War II, the gradual and predictable nature of age-related spending implies signiﬁcant scope for
anticipatory adjustments in ﬁscal policy. At a deeper level, however, it is interesting to note that the baby boom itself is a
demographic echo of World War II. The bulge in age-related public spending associated with the baby-boom generation can
thus be viewed as a further lagged ﬁscal shock triggered by that war.
154.2 Migration and Fiscal Competition: A Simple Model
Let us now return to the potential role of international migration in the context of a process
of ﬁscal adjustment. As is clear from the discussion of previous sections, economic and
demographic fundamentals (levels of development and age structures) imply that powerful
incentives for immigration from poor to rich countries will persist for at least the next
several decades. The level and composition of immigration ﬂows experienced by individual
countries will depend on local economic conditions and policies, including direct controls
over migration as well as ﬁscal policies. Nations have incentives to structure these policies
so to ease the ﬁscal adjustment process.
Generational accounting studies show that if immigrants to rich countries have character-
istics broadly similar to existing residents, in terms of income or its correlates (education,
health, longevity, etc.) and if they immigrate at young ages, then, like native young
residents, they provide positive net ﬁscal beneﬁts to these countries. However, some im-
migrants might have “better” or “worse” characteristics than natives, and, as empirical
analyses show, the ﬁscal impacts could then be quite diﬀerent: poorer, lower-skilled, sicker,
and older immigrants provide smaller net ﬁscal beneﬁts to native populations and may
impose net ﬁscal burdens, whereas better educated, wealthier, healthier and younger im-
migrants bring larger positive ﬁscal impacts.
Rich countries therefore have incentives to attract some but not all types of potential
immigrants, and to retain some but not all types of native residents. To do so, they have
several policy instruments at their disposal. First, they may attempt to impose direct
controls on migration. Restrictions on emigration are seldom imposed or enforced, so,
in practice, direct migration controls usually are limited to constraints on immigration.
Although these constraints appear at ﬁrst glance to be rigid quantitative limits, they can
be and in fact are quite ﬂexible, both because the degree of enforcement of any immigration
controls is a matter of policy discretion, and because immigration controls can be applied
in a “textured” (or discriminatory) fashion, limiting entry for some types of immigrants
but not others. Secondly, ﬁscal policies aﬀect migration incentives, and these policies can
also be altered in ways that inﬂuence migration. As in the case of direct immigration
controls, ﬁscal policies can be adjusted in many distinct respects, creating the potential
to strengthen incentives that attract some types of immigrants while weakening incentives
for others. Note that ﬁscal policies can inﬂuence emigration incentives, even though direct
emigration controls may be infeasible.
The literature dealing with ﬁscal competition provides a framework for analyzing the choice
of ﬁscal and regulatory policies, and their interactions, in the face of actual or potential
migration.16 A simple model, based on this literature, can be used to examine some of the
key policy questions that arise in the global competition for potentially mobile workers.
To begin with, consider a snapshot of an overlapping generations model in a single period,
focusing initially on a country that attracts immigrants from abroad.
Suppose that national output is a concave function F(L) of the eﬀective labor force L.
Initially, there is a stock L0
i “native” workers of type i, where i represents worker attributes,
such as skill levels, initial wealth holdings, and other characteristics that aﬀect workers’




16See, e.g., Wilson (1999), Wildasin (1998, 2006), and Wilson and Wildasin (2004) for overivews of this literature.
16is the eﬀective labor supply of a worker of type i. Workers are young and are assumed
to be mobile. (More precisely, some but not necessarily all workers are assumed to be
mobile.) In addition, there is a ﬁxed population of elderly, who do not work and who
are not mobile. In order to focus on the eﬀects of policies on the native population as a
whole, assume for simplicity that lump-sum redistribution between old and young native
residents is possible so that their net incomes may be aggregated.
Young workers may enter the country from abroad, with Mi the number of immigrants of
type i. The total eﬀective labor force, inclusive of immigrants, is then L = L0 +
P
i αiMi.
Let τi be the net ﬁscal contribution, in present value terms, made by a worker of type i.17
National output is paid out partly to immigrants, with
P
i αiMiF 0(L) the total gross wages




= L0F 0(L), and total non-wage income, assumed for simplicity to accrue solely to native
residents, is F(L)−LF 0(L). Thus, ignoring ﬁscal transfers, the aggregate income of native
residents is L0F 0(L) + F(L) − LF 0(L) = F(L) − (L − L0)F 0(L) = F(L) −
P
i αiMiF 0(L).
Taking the ﬁscal system into account, the net income of native residents is








To connect this notation to the previous discussion, observe that immigrants may make
positive or negative net transfers to native residents, depending on the values of the ﬁscal
variables τi. As discussed above, it is hazardous to generalize about the empirical value
of τi because of the diversity of immigrants and of ﬁscal systems. In practice, τi > 0
for highly-skilled immigrants earning suﬃciently high wages in the above-ground economy
since they make large positive net ﬁscal contributions. Conversely, τi may be negative for
low-skilled, low-wage immigrants who receive large ﬁscal beneﬁts from welfare payments
or health beneﬁts. If immigrants are prevented from enjoying welfare or health beneﬁts
because of administrative restrictions, ﬁscal discrimination, or illegal status, τi could be
positive even for low-skilled immigrants. The key point is that τi depends on both of
the attributes of immigrants themselves and of the entire ﬁscal system, including taxes,
expenditures, and, not least, the regulatory and administrative features of these systems
that determine eﬀective eligibility for beneﬁts and eﬀective enforcement of tax obligations.
From a policy perspective, τi is not empirically given but is rather to be determined. This
is the perspective oﬀered by analyses of ﬁscal competition.
From the viewpoint of native residents, net income W depends on the numbers of migrants
of each type and on their ﬁscal treatment. Suppose that migrants of type i can attain
lifetime net incomes of ¯ wi in their home countries and that no rich country’s policies aﬀect
¯ wi. In the absence of any restraints on migration, net incomes for migrants in source and
destination countries tend toward equality, i.e.,
¯ wi = αiF
0(L) − τi, (3)
assuming that Mi > 0. If direct regulatory constraints on immigration through limitations
on employment permits, visas, etc. are feasible and are binding, then
¯ wi < αiF
0(L) − τi, (4)
17In terms of Auerbach-Kotlikoﬀ generational accounting, this is the present value of lifetime taxes less the present value
of lifetime pension beneﬁts and other cash and in-kind transfers.
17where in this case the level of immigration is eﬀectively constrained by the regulatory limit
¯ Mi so that Mi = ¯ Mi.
This simple model illuminates how policies can be used to advance the interests of na-
tive residents, as described by the simple welfare indicator W. Note ﬁrst that dW/ ¯ Mi =
αiF 00(L) + τi > 0 if τi > 0 and if immigration controls are binding. That is, it is advanta-
geous to native residents to relax binding immigration constraints on migrants who make
positive net ﬁscal contributions. Even if τi < 0, it is still possible that relaxation of im-
migration constraints could beneﬁt native residents. If τi is suﬃciently negative, however,
natives would beneﬁt from tighter immigration constraints. Within this model, then, there
is a rationale for the imposition of binding immigration controls on some types of potential
immigrants – those that impose large ﬁscal burdens. The model also shows why countries
have incentives to impose selective (or discriminatory) immigration controls, allowing free
immigration for those who are net ﬁscal contributors.
But direct immigration controls are only one margin of policy. The model also shows
what ﬁscal policies beneﬁt native residents. First, note that if immigration constraints
are binding, then dW/dτi = Mi > 0: the optimal policy is to impose more taxes on
immigrants, or to reduce their ﬁscal beneﬁts, as long as a binding immigration quota is in
place (see Sandmo and Wildasin (1999) for more extensive discussion of this issue). An
immediate corollary of this result, however, is that direct immigration controls become
irrelevant (nonbinding) if ﬁscal policies are optimally adjusted, since immigration controls
cannot be binding if τi is suﬃciently high (i.e., inequality (4) cannot hold for suﬃciently
large τi). Equivalently, binding immigration controls indicate that ﬁscal policy has not
been optimized. These two types of policies are thus highly mutually dependent.
To characterize optimal ﬁscal policy still more precisely, we may now ask what value of
τi maximizes welfare for native residents in the absence of direct immigration controls. In
the absence of immigration quotas, (3) must hold. It follows that dW/dτi = τi/F 00(L),
which is negative if τi > 0 and positive if τi < 0. It follows that ﬁscal policy is optimized
only when τi = 0 for all i, that is, net ﬁscal beneﬁts and burdens should be reduced to
zero for all immigrant types.
It is not diﬃcult to incorporate emigration into this model. The same essential conclusions
continue to hold: ﬁscal policies that reduce the number of net ﬁscal contributors harm
native residents, while policies that reduce the number of households imposing net ﬁscal
burdens are beneﬁcial to them. The optimal policy is one that shifts τi toward zero for
potential emigrants as well as for potential immigrants.
The preceding analysis is based on a highly stylized model. Some of the conclusions based
upon it continue to hold, even when some assumptions are relaxed, while other elements
of the model are more critical. For example, suppose that immigrants cannot migrate at
zero cost, but must instead incur some migration cost c. The incorporation of migration
costs has an impact on the amount of migration that occurs but has no eﬀect on the basic
insights of the model. (This is easily seen by noting that introducing a migration cost
c is formally equivalent to raising the value of the parameter ¯ wi by the amount c.) It
can be argued, however, that migration (a ﬂow) is a kind of stock-adjustment process,
and that migration costs are properly modeled in an explicitly dynamic setting. In a
model that allows for sluggish dynamic adjustment because of mobility costs, many of
the key qualitative insights derived above continue to hold, but some must be modiﬁed
18quantitatively (Wildasin (2003)). In particular, the optimal ﬁscal burden on an imperfectly
mobile resource may not be zero, but positive, and proportional to the speed with which the
stock of the resource adjusts to changes in its net rate of return. A factor that responds very
rapidly – highly liquid ﬁnancial assets would be an example (see Huizinga and Nicod` eme
(2004)) – would optimally bear a zero net ﬁscal burden. But it may be optimal to impose
signiﬁcant ﬁscal burdens on resources whose stocks respond only sluggishly. Some types of
labor and ﬁxed capital investments could thus face signiﬁcant ﬁscal burdens – up to and
including conﬁscatory burdens, if these are feasible.
To summarize, competitive pressures provide incentives for governments to adjust tax and
expenditure policies in ways that are “favorable” to resources that they seek to attract
and “unfavorable” to resources that they wish to repel. In the simplest cases, this would
mean, for instance, cutting income taxes on the rich or reducing welfare beneﬁts for the
poor. In a pure limiting case, ﬁscal policies would collect revenues from all households in
accordance with the cost of providing public services to them, that is, no potentially mobile
households would impose net ﬁscal burdens or be net ﬁscal contributors. This of course
does not in any way imply that taxes would approach zero, any more than competition
among ﬁrms implies that prices approach zero. Rather, competition for mobile households
would reduce cross-subsidies or redistribution among households by bringing taxes (and
public-sector prices) into close alignment with the costs of whatever levels of public services
are provided. Limiting cases are not to be taken literally, of course. The general conclusion
to draw from analyses of ﬁscal competition is that competitive pressures are likely to
constrain ﬁscal policies, in the direction of reduced redistribution, for resources that are
relatively highly mobile. In reality, neither the international movement of people and the
adjustment of ﬁscal policies occur instantaneously. The adaptation of ﬁscal systems to
international mobility, like their response to the aging of the population, is sure to be a
gradual process.
4.3 Margins of Fiscal Adjustment with Migration
Let us now consider in more detail how age-imbalanced societies may adjust their ﬁscal
and other policies, taking into account the potential for international migration.
Reform of Public Pension and Health Systems. For countries with large underfunded sys-
tems of pension and health beneﬁts for the old, young workers with high lifetime earnings
prospects are ﬁscally attractive. Workers at mid-life with high current earnings and good
health would also be net ﬁscal contributors to such systems. Others, however, would make
only modest contributions or could add net ﬁscal burdens. At a time of ﬁscal stress, pol-
icy reforms that shift ﬁscal burdens away from desired immigrants and that shift beneﬁts
toward them would encourage ﬁscally-favorable migration ﬂows, while policies that work
in the reverse direction would discourage them.
First and most obviously, beneﬁt reductions at the expense of the current old population,
by reducing the need for taxes on working populations, would help to attract and retain
young, high-skilled workers. “Private accounts” or other reforms that reduce the amounts
of transfers from young to old would have a similar eﬀect. Caps on the maximum amount of
annual “contributions” to the public pension system and health systems or closer linkages
between beneﬁts and earnings, which limit intragenerational redistribution within these
19systems, also work in the same direction. The net ﬁscal beneﬁt to a country of immigrants
of any type would tend to converge under such reforms, as poor immigrants are more
attractive when the beneﬁts that they receive are reduced, whereas rich immigrants are
less attractive when the beneﬁts that they receive are made more generous.
However, while beneﬁt reductions would help to restore ﬁscal balance without imposing
added burdens on young and highly-skilled immigrants, competitive pressures are by no
means the exclusive determinants of ﬁscal policies. In countries with rapidly aging native
populations and immigration of young workers, rapid reductions in pension beneﬁts which
harm existing retirees or those about to retire, are disproportionately burdensome to native
residents. By contrast, tax increases would shift more of the burden of public pension
adjustment onto immigrants rather than natives. In EU countries, voter participation
rates (and rates of political participation generally) are considerably higher for natives
relative to immigrants.18 Given that there are already substantial immigrant populations
in these countries, political pressures might well favor tax increases rather than beneﬁt
reductions because the former places more of the burden of ﬁscal adjustment on immigrants
relative to natives.
Thus, whereas competition for internationally-mobile workers would create incentives to
address ﬁscal imbalances in public pension and health systems through beneﬁt reductions,
native residents may also be able to shift ﬁscal burdens to existing (and imperfectly mobile)
immigrant populations through higher taxes. An important open question for students of
political economy is the relative importance of the market environment – in this context,
the mobility of labor – in inﬂuencing the political process in favor of a group – current
and prospective immigrants – who may not have the franchise and who generally have
relatively little representation in the political process. The adjustment paths followed by
countries with underfunded old-age social insurance systems will shed light on the value
of the franchise and the impact of market constraints on political decisionmaking.
Migration Policy. As noted above, immigration controls can be and sometimes are used
to achieve selective migration incentives, for example to facilitate immigration by those
with high levels of education, high levels of wealth, or other desirable characteristics.
Restrictions on immigration based on country of origin can provide a complementary
policy instrument. The US and Canada already have such policies in place.
In Western Europe, membership in the European Union limits the extent to which indi-
vidual countries can impose such controls on citizens of other EU countries; freedom of
movement is one of the basic rights of EU citizens. As a practical matter, the absence of
internal border controls also constrains the ability of any one country to limit immigration
by non-EU citizens since such immigrants, once admitted to the EU, can move relatively
freely among EU countries. Of course, free internal migration (and capital movements)
can provide substantial beneﬁts to the residents of any large region – the US, Canada,
or the EU – by facilitating the market-directed movement of workers from low- to high-
productivity employment, raising output and incomes.19 The prospect of such gains helps
18For example, a recent survey of voting participation in European countries found that 73% of native residents voted in
the most recent national election, whereas only 36% of immigrants voted (European Social Survey (2004)). In part, this
reﬂects varying levels of eligibility to vote: 33% of immigrants were not eligible to vote, in contrast to only 6% of natives.
However, even among those eligible to vote, turnout rates were much lower for immigrants (about .5) than for natives (about
.75).
19In this context, it is important to note that gross rates of internal migration commonly exceed net rates by an order
of magnitude, even at large geographic scales, and have done so for decades. Although (to this author’s knowledge) no
20to underpin the commitment to the principle (if not always the practice) of free inter-
nal labor mobility, deeply embedded in EU institutions (along with the principle of free
internal trade) since its inception.
Limited barriers to internal migration within the EU mean that the level of enforcement of
border controls by any one EU country has important spillover eﬀects on other EU coun-
tries, presenting a potential free-rider problem. If external border controls are eﬀectively
enforced, then the EU countries can collectively limit the inﬂows of older, low-skilled, un-
healthy, or otherwise ﬁscally less-attractive migrants. On the other hand, countries that
fail to enforce external border controls have the potential to create signiﬁcant ﬁscal bur-
dens on other EU countries toward which such migrants would especially be likely to move.
The instances cited above concerning the high welfare participation rates of poor migrants
in Sweden, Germany, and Denmark illustrates the potential diﬃculty that a common bor-
der may create. (Italy and Spain are often characterized as conduits to the EU for illegal
immigrants from third-world countries.)
Similar issues arise in the US vis-a-vis state governments. The ﬁscal implications are far
diﬀerent in the US, however, since state governments account for a very modest share of
the redistributive transfers undertaken by the public sector; in the EU, almost all redis-
tributional activities are undertaken at the level of the nation rather than at the level of
the EU proper. Lax enforcement of border controls by some EU countries strengthens
competitive incentives to limit social beneﬁts for the poor. In principle, these competitive
pressures could be eased by coordinated commitments by EU member states to redistribu-
tive transfers, to eﬀective border enforcement, or both. Such coordination is not easily
achieved, however. “Upward reassignment” of responsibility from EU member states to
the EU itself – for redistribution, border controls, or both – oﬀers a potential alternative
institutional mechanism for limiting ﬁscally burdensome immigration.
The Withering Away of the Welfare State? Large ﬂows of migrants from poor to rich
countries testify to the mobility of relatively poor and low-skilled people. Many empirical
analyses, especially of internal migration in countries like the US and Canada, show that
skilled and well-educated people are also highly and even disproportionately mobile.20 In
addition to their public pension and health systems, which transfer resources across gener-
ations, the ﬁscal systems of modern rich countries also redistribute resources from rich to
poor. For these countries, poor immigrants (or residents) impose large ﬁscal burdens while
the rich make large ﬁscal contributions. The world’s stock of skilled workers constitute
a valuable resource for which rich countries have incentives to compete, while low-skilled
workers represent potential ﬁscal burdens (or more modest ﬁscal contributions). The ex-
tent to which tax and expenditure systems capture resources from those at the high end of
the skill distribution and transfer them to those at the low end inﬂuences the attractiveness
of diﬀerent countries for diﬀerent types of migrants.
Competition for mobile labor may create political pressures for reduced redistribution
through the ﬁscal system. Symmetrically, reductions in the amount of ﬁscal redistribu-
tion may reduce political pressures for immigration controls – speciﬁcally, for limits on
the immigration of poor and unskilled migrants. In earlier (pre-twentieth century) eras
estimates have yet been made of the productivity impact of gross migration ﬂows within the US or Canada, the continuous
inter-regional movement of workers, especially highly-skilled workers, is clearly an important part of the mechanism through
which human resources are matched to employment opportunities. See Wildasin (2005) for further discussion.
20See, e.g., Kodrycki (2001) and Bound et al. (2001) for recent examples and additional references.
21of migration, the “welfare state” did not yet exist, and most of the gains and losses from
migration accrued to or were borne by migrants themselves. The distribution of the ﬁscal
impacts of migration is very diﬀerent in an economy where public revenues and expen-
ditures approach one-half of GDP. In such societies, important economic impacts from
migration are transmitted through the ﬁscal system to the rest of the population, which
thus has a strong incentive to limit “unfavorable” migration, if possible. If ﬁscal redis-
tribution diminishes, whether because of competition for mobile resources or otherwise,
the ﬁscal payoﬀ to the regulation of migration diminishes, and liberalization of migration
policies would become politically more attractive.21
Capital Tax Competition. Personal income taxes provide an opportunity, if desired, to
tax capital as well as wage income at the household level and to do so with a progressive
rate structure. This means that a household’s incentive to reside in a country – household
locational choices – may depend on the taxation of capital income. To attract high-
income households, a country could limit the taxation of capital income by maintaining a
ﬂat rather than progressive rate structure, by relying relatively little on personal income
taxes and relatively more heavily on other types of taxes (such as payroll taxes), and
by providing opportunities to escape taxation by rich households through tax shelters
or special tax provisions that reduce eﬀective tax burdens on capital. Since immigrants
are relatively more highly represented in younger age cohorts, a disproportionate share
of capital income accrues to natives at present. Relatively heavy current taxation of
capital income at the household level might thus be an attractive feature of a tax system
if competition for mobile labor creates pressures to limit tax burdens on young mobile
workers. Over time, however, immigrants can be expected to move up through the age
distribution, acquiring an increasing share of capital and capital income within the country
in the process. Heavier eﬀective taxation of capital income would not deter entry by such
immigrants if these taxes are expected to fall in the future. If high current taxes signal
high taxes in the future, however, then the opposite would be true.22
Capital income can also be taxed on a source basis, for instance through corporation
income taxation. There is an extensive literature that examines source based taxation
of capital income when capital is mobile but labor is not. Suppose, however, that both
labor (or at least young people) are mobile. The complementarity of labor and capital
in production then implies that they tend to move together – in ﬁxed proportions, in
the extreme case where capital and labor are perfect complements, but at least to some
degree, in less extreme cases. Fiscal policies inherit this complementarity. For instance,
investment subsidies that attract capital also increase the demand for labor, and taxes on
workers aﬀect not only the locational choices of labor but the ﬂow of capital as well. In the
polar case of perfect complementarity, labor and capital constitute a bundled composite
input and only the ﬁscal treatment of the entire bundle, rather than its component parts,
would be relevant for migration/capital ﬂow incentives.
This complementarity – of inputs, and of ﬁscal policy – is often used to justify local
economic development/investment incentives on the grounds that they increase the local
21Recent analysis by Hanson et al. (2005) indicates that public opinion toward migration is less favorable in US states
that provide generous transfers to the poor ﬁnanced by heavier taxes on the rich.
22Analogous issues arise with respect to value-added taxation. Falling VAT rates over time are roughly equivalent to
declining taxation of capital income, implying relatively high taxes on old residents and lower future taxes on those who are
currently young. A policy of falling VAT rates, if anticipated, could encourage capital accumulation and immigration by
young workers who expect to accumulate capital over time.
22local employment, wages, or both. In the long run, such policies increase the incentives
for workers to migrate to locations with investment-promoting ﬁscal policies. At the
international level, the recent experience of Ireland may be cited as one possible example of
such a process. A favorable investment climate in Ireland is argued to have contributed to
that country’s rapid economic growth and an accompanying dramatic reversal of migration
ﬂows: Ireland, which for long parts of its history has been an emigration country, has
recently experienced a high level of immigration which, in turn, has helped to sustain the
economic expansion (see Figure 5, Barrett et al. (2000), and Barrett (2002)).
These remarks suggest that intensiﬁed ﬁscal competition for capital investment might
be one facet of a process of ﬁscal competition for mobile workers. Most theoretical and
empirical research on ﬁscal competition has focused on competition for a single mobile
resource, and – with some noteworthy exceptions – has not yet addressed the simultaneous
determination of the ﬁscal treatment of multiple mobile resources through multiple ﬁscal
instruments. This is an area of ongoing research.23
Other Fiscal Policy Margins. To take one ﬁnal example of a possible margin of policy ad-
justment, consider the relationship between monetary and ﬁscal policy. High ﬁscal deﬁcits
create pressures for (non-independent) central banks to monetize government debt. One
response to the problem of funding public pensions would be for ﬁscal authorities to rely
on debt ﬁnancing of pension beneﬁts which could then be accommodated by expansionary
(and possibly inﬂationary) monetary policy. A desire to avoid such outcomes is presum-
ably the underlying rationale for the ﬁscal criteria imposed on members of the EMU: ﬁscal
discipline enhances the prospects for a credibly independent ECB. However, low fertility
rates could make it increasingly diﬃcult for EU countries to adhere to the EMU ﬁscal
criteria because of the problem of public pension funding.
Expansionary monetary policy at the EMU level, on the other hand, could contribute to
higher output, tighter labor markets, and lower unemployment in the EU countries. This
in turn would raise the demand for immigrants and would contribute to increased inﬂows of
younger workers. This could constitute yet one more margin of policy adjustment through
which low fertility, the aging of the European populations, and associated ﬁnancial stress
on public pension systems is partly addressed through increased migration.
4.4 Global Inequality and Human Capital Investment
The time horizon for adjustment of policy in response to population aging is long. Over
such a horizon, the global stock of skilled workers can and will change. If ﬁscal policies in
rich countries adjust in ways that raise the net incomes of highly-skilled young workers, the
incentive to acquire skills will rise, both within these countries and throughout the world.
As noted in the original “brain drain” literature (e.g., Bhagwati and Partington (1976))
the migration of skilled workers from poor to rich countries can deplete valuable human
resources from the former. To the extent that the returns to human capital investment in
23Authors such as Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) and Keen and Marchand (1997) have discussed the implications of ﬁscal
competition for the mix of taxes and for the composition of public expenditures, focusing on the case where there is only
a single mobile factor of production. Wilson (1995) explicitly considers the case where both labor and capital are mobile,
showing how competition for these resources aﬀects equilibrium ﬁscal structures. Redoano (2004) presents an initial empirical
analysis of ﬁscal interactions among EU countries. Wildasin (2004) investigates how the degree of factor mobility (measured
by dynamic speeds of adjustment to changes in policy) can aﬀect the structure of a ﬁscal regime.
23poor countries accrue to other nations, the incentives to devote public-sector resources to
education may diminish. On the other hand, the incentive to devote private resources to
education presumably rises: for students or their families, education provides an oppor-
tunity to work in rewarding environments, whether within the home region or elsewhere.
Improved opportunities elsewhere, i.e., participation in the global market for skilled labor,
raises the private return to education. Indeed, the well-documented persistently high rates
of internal migration for highly-educated workers in the US and Canada illustrates that
the option to migrate is frequently exercised, which is to say that the incentive to invest
in education would be diminished, in these countries, if migration options were restrained.
Global competition for skilled workers, then, should raise the private rate of return to,
and thus demand for, investment in human capital. For the rich countries, reductions
in the amount of ﬁscal redistribution, to the extent that they occur, should raise the
“net” education premium, i.e., the real income diﬀerential, net of all taxes and transfers,
between skilled and unskilled workers. Supply response to rising demands for human
capital investment can occur either through the private sector (purely private education),
through the public sector (purely public education), or through a mix of the two (e.g.,
loans, tax relief, and other ﬁscal support for education that may take place partly at
private institutions, and increased reliance on tuition and fees to ﬁnance education at
public institutions). Public-sector support for education is frequently justiﬁed on the
grounds that young people or their families face liquidity constraints that limit their ability
to invest in human capital, a constraint that is presumably more severe in poor than in
rich countries. Young people from poor countries now acquire skills and education both
at home and abroad; rich countries at present provide signiﬁcant public support for the
advanced education of students from poor countries, resulting in part in return migration
of newly-educated workers to the latter (a reverse brain drain) but also facilitating the
retention of some portion of recent graduates. Age-related ﬁscal stresses in rich countries
thus give rise to complex interactions with the ﬁnancing of education both in rich and in
poor countries. In the former, an increase in the proportion of domestically-trained skilled
workers can produce a ﬁscal dividend, but public expenditures for education are likely to
be constrained by the rising marginal cost of public funds over time. In the latter, the
international mobility of skilled workers limits the return to public investment in education
even as it raises the private return, presumably giving rise to incentives to shift toward
increased reliance on private ﬁnancing where the means to do so can be found.24
5 Conclusion
Extensive research by economic historians (O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) and numer-
ous references therein) reminds us that “globalization” is not a new phenomenon. The
experience of the 19th century demonstrates that international linkages – particularly the
international movement of labor and capital, but also international trade – can have pro-
found eﬀects on economic growth and on the distribution of income within and among
countries. International migration and capital ﬂows today, like those of earlier eras, is
driven by the desire of people to relocate themselves (through migration) and their re-
24For further discussion of the implications of labor mobility for investment in human capital, see, e.g., Wildasin (2000),
Poutvaara (2001), Andersson and Konrad (2001, 2003), and Thum and Uebbelmesser (2003).
24sources (through capital ﬂows) to locations with greater economic opportunity and higher
economic returns.
While “globalization” is not a new phenomenon, there are some new things under the
sun. In the realm of demography, we now witness fertility rates well below replacement
rates in large regions, a situation without historical precedent. Low fertility rates and
rising life expectancies must, in themselves, have important impacts on labor markets and
ﬁscal systems in rich countries. Intergenerational transfers of historically unprecedented
magnitudes in these countries give rise to tight linkages between demographic and ﬁscal
conditions. Large international fertility diﬀerentials imply internationally unbalanced pop-
ulation age structures, coupled with large and persistent real income diﬀerentials between
high-fertility and low-fertility regions, have created powerful incentives for international
migration.
For these reasons, the economic impacts of “globalization”, and especially the integration
of markets for labor and capital, diﬀer in important respects from previous experience.
International capital ﬂows have received a great deal of attention in the public economics
literature dealing with factor market integration and ﬁscal competition. The lion’s share
of public sector expenditures and revenues are closely linked to population, however, and
the implications of international migration are therefore of especially critical importance.
Of course, the international allocation of labor and capital are far from unrelated. This
linkage means that tax, expenditure, and regulatory policies must be examined with an
eye to their eﬀects on both capital and labor allocations and ﬂows.
Redistribution of income requires ﬁscal contributions, and ﬁscal contributors are scarce
resources in societies with extensive redistributive policies. Skilled workers play a vital
role in the ﬁscal systems of advanced economies, and may easily be “worth their weight
in gold”, bringing ﬁscal dividends of substantial size to the societies in which they reside.
Competitive pressures to attract such contributors is always present, but intensiﬁes as
the shadow value of ﬁscal resources rises. In the context of migration, this competition
can take several forms. More favorable ﬁscal treatment of highly-skilled workers is one
instrument at the disposal of governments. On the tax side, more favorable treatment may
include reduced progressivity of tax rate structures or increased reliance on consumption
taxation (especially through VAT or other commodity-based taxes rather than personal
taxation). Highly-skilled workers anticipate high lifetime earnings streams and above-
average wealth accumulation, and hence tax burdens on them can be reduced through
tax deferral or avoidance devices such as favorable tax treatment of capital gains, stock
options, and closely-held business entities. On the expenditure side, competitive pressures
favor provision of public goods and services valued especially by highly-skilled workers,
and especially by highly-skilled immigrants.
One implication of such ﬁscal competition is that it tends to erode the ﬁscal dividends
that new highly-skilled workers bring to a society. In the extreme, pure ﬁscal competition
among many nations tends to unravel redistribution among the owners of mobile resources,
including skilled workers, at which point the provision of public goods and services is
brought into alignment with taxes. This is not, or need not be, a “race to the bottom”,
either in the sense that it happens rapidly (“a race”) or in the sense that taxes and public
expenditures are driven toward zero (“the bottom”). On a much smaller geographical
scale, protracted competition among local school districts in the US has not produced
25identical levels local education spending and taxation, even in the face of extensive state-
government ﬁscal policies aimed at reducing dispersion of local ﬁscal policies, and the
quality – and expense – of some public schools in the US is far from any sort of educational
“bottom”. Competition does, however, raise the cost of redistribution, even as it may
improve eﬃciency.
Policy competition for skilled workers need not occur only through ﬁscal policy. Regu-
latory policies – immigration quotas are the most obvious illustration – can also have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on migration ﬂows. This type of competition is complementary with ﬁs-
cal competition. In particular, nations have incentives to ease immigration restrictions on
immigrants who produce large ﬁscal dividends, and to tighten them on immigrants who
produce large ﬁscal burdens. Existing immigration policies in many countries already re-
ﬂect this principle, in that they contain special provisions for workers with skills in “high
demand”, who have the resources and intention of starting new businesses, or who in
other ways are distinguished by talent, wealth, and good future prospects. Long applicant
queues for such workers are evidence that a nation may reap added ﬁscal beneﬁts from
targeted liberalization of immigration restrictions. Lax enforcement of border controls
for low-skilled workers oﬀers an opportunity for ﬁscal discrimination between high- and
low-skilled workers.
In this setting, it is important to understand, on the one hand, how immigration can aﬀect
the ﬁscal systems of these countries. At the same time, ﬁscal policy can aﬀect migration
incentives and ﬂows. The discussion above has examined some of the possible mechanisms
of policy adjustment that EU and other rich countries may follow as they manage the
ﬁscal stresses imposed by aging populations on their ﬁscal systems. Public pension reforms
are one likely consequence of these stresses. Changes in the taxation of individuals and
businesses, the provision of public goods and services, and redistributive transfers, are
also likely to play a role in the adjustment of EU ﬁscal systems to new demographic
structures. The competition for mobile labor, in particular, may play an important role
in creating incentives for ﬁscal adjustment. A deep and interesting question is whether
existing institutional structures for policymaking are well adapted to the management of
such complex, interrelated, and potentially far-reaching policy adjustment and, if not, how
demographic pressures may ultimately play a role in shaping institutional change.
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30TABLE 1
Fertility Rates and Old-age Dependency Ratios
Curent and Projected, for OECD Countries
Old-Age Dependency Ratios
2000 2050 2000 2035--2050
Australia 1.72 1.56 20.4 47.0
Austria 1.31 1.50 25.2 58.2
Belgium 1.54 1.80 28.1 49.5
Canada 1.62 1.50 20.4 45.9
Czech Rep. 1.14 1.50 21.9 57.5
Denmark 1.77 1.80 24.2 40.3
Finland 1.73 1.70 25.9 40.3
France 1.73 1.80 27.2 50.8
Germany 1.40 1.50 26.6 53.2
Hungary 1.30 1.60 23.7 47.2
Italy 1.22 1.50 28.8 66.8
Japan 1.38 1.61 27.7 64.6
Korea 1.71 1.59 11.3 45.5
Netherlands 1.71 1.80 21.9 44.9
New Zealand 1.98 1.90 20.4 48.3
Norway 1.80 1.80 25.6 41.2
Poland 1.34 1.58 20.4 55.2
Portugal 1.53 1.70 26.7 50.9
Spain 1.19 1.50 27.1 65.7
Sweden 1.50 1.80 29.4 46.3
UK 1.72 1.80 26.6 45.3
US 2.05 1.95 21.7 37.9
Unweighted 
Average 1.56 1.67 24.1 50.1
Source: Dang et al. (2001), Tables 1, A.1.
Fertility RatesInternational Migration Rates, Selected OECD Countries
Selected Years, 1988--2005
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Austria
Inflow 0.73% 0.81% 0.92% 1.15% 1.20% 1.33% 1.23%
Outflow 0.55% 0.55% 0.63% 0.48% 0.57% 0.59% 0.57%
Net 0.18% 0.27% 0.29% 0.67% 0.63% 0.74% 0.65%
Gross/Net 7.28 5.11 5.3 2.4 2.8 2.6 2.8
Gross  1.29% 1.36% 1.55% 1.63% 1.77% 1.92% 1.80%
Belgium
Inflow 0.39% 0.51% 0.55% 0.55% 0.51% 0.50% 0.67% 0.64% 0.68% 0.66% 0.69% 0.74%
Outflow 0.33% 0.27% 0.28% 0.34% 0.32% 0.36% 0.35% 0.31% 0.30% 0.33% 0.36% 0.37%
Net 0.06% 0.24% 0.27% 0.22% 0.19% 0.14% 0.32% 0.34% 0.38% 0.34% 0.33% 0.37%
Gross/Net 11.9 3.3 3.1 4.1 4.3 6.0 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.9 3.2 3.0
Gross  0.71% 0.78% 0.83% 0.89% 0.83% 0.85% 1.02% 0.95% 0.98% 0.99% 1.06% 1.11%
Denmark
Inflow 0.27% 0.29% 0.33% 0.25% 0.24% 0.23% 0.43% 0.47% 0.41% 0.35% 0.35%
Outflow 0.10% 0.09% 0.09% 0.10% 0.11% 0.15% 0.16% 0.17% 0.16% 0.16% 0.17%
Net 0.17% 0.20% 0.23% 0.15% 0.13% 0.09% 0.27% 0.30% 0.25% 0.19% 0.17%
Gross/Net 2.2 1.9 1.8 2.3 2.8 4.3 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.0
Gross  0.37% 0.38% 0.42% 0.34% 0.36% 0.38% 0.58% 0.64% 0.57% 0.51% 0.52%
Finland
Inflow 0.13% 0.21% 0.15% 0.15% 0.16% 0.18% 0.21% 0.19% 0.18% 0.22% 0.24%
Outflow 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.06% 0.03% 0.08% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.08% 0.05%
Net 0.11% 0.18% 0.12% 0.09% 0.13% 0.10% 0.17% 0.14% 0.14% 0.14% 0.19%
Gross/Net 1.3 1.3 1.5 2.3 1.5 2.6 1.5 1.8 1.6 2.2 1.5
Gross  0.15% 0.24% 0.18% 0.21% 0.19% 0.26% 0.25% 0.25% 0.22% 0.30% 0.29%
Germany
Inflow 0.83% 1.06% 1.50% 0.95% 0.86% 0.74% 0.79% 0.83% 0.80% 0.73% 0.73% 0.70%
Outflow 0.46% 0.59% 0.76% 0.76% 0.68% 0.78% 0.68% 0.60% 0.61% 0.60% 0.66% 0.59%
Net 0.37% 0.47% 0.74% 0.19% 0.18% -0.04% 0.11% 0.23% 0.19% 0.12% 0.07% 0.12%
Gross/Net 3.5 3.5 3.1 9.2 8.5 -37.1 14.0 6.3 7.6 10.7 20.8 11.1
Gross  1.29% 1.65% 2.26% 1.71% 1.55% 1.52% 1.47% 1.44% 1.41% 1.33% 1.39% 1.29%International Migration Rates, Selected OECD Countries (Cont'd)
Selected Years, 1988--2005
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Luxembourg
Inflow 2.19% 2.44% 2.50% 2.28% 2.21% 2.49% 2.47% 2.49% 2.44% 2.56% 2.76% 2.97%
Outflow 1.41% 1.44% 1.43% 1.31% 1.35% 1.57% 1.62% 1.71% 1.84% 2.09% 2.40% 2.37%
Net 0.77% 1.00% 1.07% 0.97% 0.87% 0.91% 0.85% 0.79% 0.60% 0.47% 0.35% 0.59%
Gross/Net 4.7 3.9 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.4 4.8 5.3 7.1 10.0 14.6 9.0
Gross  3.60% 3.88% 3.94% 3.59% 3.56% 4.06% 4.09% 4.20% 4.28% 4.64% 5.16% 5.34%
Netherlands
Inflow 0.39% 0.54% 0.55% 0.44% 0.50% 0.52% 0.58% 0.59% 0.54% 0.45% 0.40% 0.39%
Outflow 0.14% 0.14% 0.15% 0.15% 0.14% 0.14% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.14% 0.15%
Net 0.25% 0.41% 0.40% 0.30% 0.35% 0.38% 0.44% 0.46% 0.41% 0.32% 0.26% 0.24%
Gross/Net 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.2
Gross  0.54% 0.68% 0.70% 0.59% 0.64% 0.66% 0.71% 0.72% 0.67% 0.59% 0.54% 0.54%
Norway
Inflow 0.55% 0.37% 0.40% 0.41% 0.39% 0.60% 0.62% 0.56% 0.68% 0.59% 0.61% 0.68%
Outflow 0.22% 0.23% 0.19% 0.22% 0.23% 0.27% 0.33% 0.34% 0.27% 0.31% 0.20% 0.27%
Net 0.33% 0.14% 0.21% 0.19% 0.16% 0.33% 0.29% 0.23% 0.41% 0.27% 0.41% 0.41%
Gross/Net 2.3 4.3 2.8 3.3 3.8 2.6 3.3 4.0 2.3 3.3 2.0 2.3
Gross  0.77% 0.60% 0.59% 0.63% 0.62% 0.87% 0.95% 0.90% 0.95% 0.90% 0.80% 0.95%
Sweden
Inflow 0.53% 0.62% 0.46% 0.85% 0.33% 0.40% 0.38% 0.49% 0.53% 0.54% 0.53% 0.57%
Outflow 0.14% 0.19% 0.15% 0.18% 0.16% 0.16% 0.14% 0.14% 0.16% 0.17% 0.18% 0.18%
Net 0.39% 0.43% 0.30% 0.67% 0.17% 0.24% 0.24% 0.35% 0.37% 0.37% 0.35% 0.39%
Gross/Net 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.5 3.0 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.9
Gross  0.67% 0.81% 0.61% 1.03% 0.49% 0.56% 0.52% 0.64% 0.69% 0.70% 0.71% 0.74%
Switzerland
Inflow 1.13% 1.48% 1.60% 1.29% 1.03% 1.04% 1.20% 1.36% 1.33% 1.23% 1.30% 1.27%
Outflow 0.83% 0.87% 1.15% 0.90% 0.94% 0.82% 0.77% 0.72% 0.68% 0.63% 0.65% 0.67%
Net 0.30% 0.61% 0.45% 0.39% 0.09% 0.22% 0.44% 0.64% 0.65% 0.60% 0.65% 0.60%
Gross/Net 6.5 3.9 6.1 5.7 21.5 8.4 4.5 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.2
Gross  1.97% 2.35% 2.75% 2.19% 1.97% 1.85% 1.97% 2.08% 2.00% 1.87% 1.95% 1.94%
Source: Inflows and outflows: OECD (1999a), Table A.1.1 (for 1988-1990 data); OECD(2003), Tables A.1.1, A.1.2 (for 1991--2000 data), 
OECD (2005), Tables A.1.1, A.1.2 (for 2001-2002 data);OECD (2007), Tables A.1.1, A.1.2 (for 2003-2005 data). 
Population: US Bureau of the Census, International Data Base.
Note: Data shown only for years in which both inflows and outflows are available.TABLE 3
Stocks of Foreign-Born Population, Selected OECD Countries
 As Percentage of Total
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Austria 11.2 10.5 11.1 10.8 11.4 13.0 13.5
Canada 17.4 17.8 18.1 18.4 18.6 18.7 18.9 19.1
Denmark 4.0 4.3 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.5
Finland 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.2 3.4
France 8.1
Hungary 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.3
Greece 10.3
Ireland 6.9 7.8 8.7 9.3 10.0 10.5 11.0 11.0
Luxembourg 31.5 32.2 33.2 32.8 32.9 33.0 33.1 33.4
Netherlands 8.1 9.0 9.2 9.6 10.1 10.4 10.6 10.7 10.6 10.6
Norway 5.4 5.6 6.1 6.8 6.9 7.3 7.6 7.8 8.2
Sweden 9.6 10.5 10.7 11.0 11.3 11.5 11.8 12.0 12.2 12.4
US 7.9 8.2 10.3 10.8 11.0 11.3 12.3 12.6 12.8 12.9
Source: OECD (1999a), Table A.1.5 (1990 data); OECD (2003), Table A.1.4 (1991-1992 data); 
OECD (2005), Table A.1.4 (1993--1995 data); OECD (2007) Table A.1.4 (1996-2005 data).TABLE 4
Stocks of Foreign Population, Selected OECD Countries, 
As Percentage of Total
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Austria 4.5 5.9 7.9 8.9 8.6 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.2 9.4 9.5 9.7
Belgium 8.8 9.1 9.0 9.1 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.6
Czech Republic 0.4 1.0 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7
Denmark 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.7 4.8 4.8 5.0 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.0
Finland 0.4 0.5 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2
France 6.3
Germany 7.3 8.4 8.0 8.6 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.8
Hungary 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5
Ireland 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.0 3.3 4.0 4.8 5.6 5.5 6.3
Italy 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.6 3.9 4.2 4.6
Luxembourg 27.4 29.4 31.0 32.6 34.1 35.6 37.3 37.5 38.1 38.6 39.0 39.6
Netherlands 4.2 4.6 5.0 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2
Norway 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.6 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.8
Portugal 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.1
Spain 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.1 3.9 4.6 6.2
Sweden 5.0 5.6 5.7 6.1 6.0 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3
Switzerland 15.2 16.3 17.6 18.6 18.9 19.0 19.3 19.7 19.9 20.0 20.2 20.3
UK 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.2
Source: OECD (1999a), Table A.1.6 (1988-1990 data); OECD (2003), Table A.1.5 (1992 data); OECD 2005), Table A.1.5 (1994 data); 
















































































Figure 2: Old-Age Dependency Ratio









































Figure 3: Fertility, by Region, 1960--2005
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Figure 4: GDP per Capita, by Region, 1960--2006
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US$)Figure 5
Source: OECD (2003), Chart I.10. 
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